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Abstract
Global health emergencies – like COVID-19 – pose major and recurring threats in the 
21st century. Now societies can be better protected against such harrowing outbreaks 
by analysing the detailed genetic sequence data of new pathogens. Why, then, is 
this valuable epistemic resource frequently withheld by stakeholders – hamstringing 
the international response and potentially putting lives at risk? This article initiates 
the social scientific study of bioinformational diplomacy, that is, the emerging field 
of tensions, sensitivities, practices and enabling instruments surrounding the timely 
international exchange of bioinformation about global health emergencies. The article 
genealogically locates this nascent field at the intersection of molecularised life, 
informationalised biology and securitised health. It investigates the deeper political, 
economic and scientific problematisations that are engendering this burgeoning field. 
It finally analyses the emergent international instruments developed by governments, 
scientists and industry to facilitate more rapid global sharing of bioinformation through 
novel practices of data passporting. Overall, the in-depth study of bioinformational 
diplomacy reveals just how deeply, and even constitutively, international relations 
are entangled with the life sciences – by carefully tracing how laboratory practices of 
sequencing life at molecular scale also end up recontouring the play of sovereignty, 
power and security in international relations.
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Introduction
New infectious disease outbreaks continue to pose a major and recurring global chal-
lenge in the 21st century (Davies and Wenham, 2020; Harman, 2012; Lakoff, 2017; 
Youde, 2020).1 An initially localised outbreak – like COVID-19 – can quickly spread 
across the entire world, killing millions in the process and infecting tens of millions 
more. As with many other recent outbreaks – like pandemic flu, Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS), Ebola and Zika – such global health emergencies bring harrowing 
devastation to lives, livelihoods and economies all around the planet (WHO, 2019). Yet 
advances in science and technology are also creating powerful new ways to better protect 
populations against this harmful epidemic of epidemics. Specifically, the ability to scien-
tifically analyse the detailed genetic sequence information of new pathogens can today 
significantly accelerate risk assessments, help formulate evidence-based responses and 
stimulate the rapid development of life-saving medical interventions. These vital bene-
fits can all accrue provided that key stakeholders located around the world – especially 
scientists, governments and the pharmaceutical industry – rapidly exchange this valuable 
pathogen genetic sequence data as it becomes newly generated during outbreaks. Yet 
despite a powerful global health rationale, as well as repeated calls by influential bodies 
like the World Health Organisation (WHO), the rapid international sharing of pathogen 
sequence data has proved difficult to achieve during recent outbreaks – repeatedly ham-
pering the global response and potentially putting lives at risk (Littler et al., 2017; WHO, 
2015). That data-sharing conundrum sits at the heart of an emerging field of practice that 
is captured, explored and analysed in greater detail below.
This nascent field of practice is forming because of a critical change in the way that 
global health emergencies are managed now. In the past, scientists investigating out-
breaks were still overwhelmingly reliant upon physically examining biological speci-
mens of a novel pathogen. This usually meant that scientists would have to wait for quite 
some time before such dangerous samples were first shipped safely from outbreak coun-
tries (frequently located in the Global South), to leading scientific laboratories (often 
situated in high-income countries). Today, by contrast, scientists are far less dependent 
upon receiving those biological materials. Transformative advances in sequencing tech-
nology, molecular biology and bioinformatics mean that scientists can increasingly use 
information technology to perform much of this time-sensitive work virtually and com-
putationally – just by rapidly analysing a pathogen’s digital sequence data, which con-
tains the order of the four chemical building blocks (or bases) making up DNA/RNA 
molecules (García-Sancho, 2012). As sequencing technology becomes ever more power-
ful, affordable and portable, such pathogen sequence data can be generated in near ‘real-
time’ during global health emergencies, and some epidemiologists are already taking 
mobile sequencing equipment directly to the source of new outbreaks (Gardy et al., 
2015; Shaw and Sugden, 2018).
Despite the growing centrality of pathogen genetic sequence data for managing global 
health emergencies, however, social scientists outside of the community of sequencing 
professionals know surprisingly little about the social processes through which such 
pathogen sequence data are acquired, exchanged and circulated (or not) internationally 
(Wellcome Trust, 2018: 2). There has been no systematic social scientific exploration of 
this emerging field of international sequence data sharing to date – only a patchwork of 
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anecdotal accounts, editorials, blogs, case studies, ad-hoc initiatives, think-tank reports 
and newspaper articles clustered around particular outbreaks. What obstacles are hinder-
ing the timely international sharing of bioinformation about global health emergencies? 
How do the requirements of such informational exchanges differ in comparison to older 
forms of sharing biological specimens? What, moreover, are the new infrastructures 
emerging to make this bioinformation flow more quickly between stakeholders located 
all around the world?
This article develops a new analytical framework to initiate the in-depth investigation 
of that emergent field of practice: bioinformational diplomacy. Bioinformational diplo-
macy can be defined as the emerging field of tensions, sensitivities, practices and ena-
bling instruments surrounding the timely international exchange of bioinformation about 
global health emergencies. The core problematisation residing at the centre of this 
emerging field is how critical bioinformation can be quickly shared internationally for 
the purposes of better managing lethal infectious disease outbreaks. Bioinformational 
diplomacy thus comporises three constituent elements. First, it encompasses the broad 
array of actors and technologies variously involved in generating, exchanging, utilising 
or otherwise bearing upon the international flow of such bioinformation – especially (but 
by no means restricted to) governments, scientists and industry. Second, it is constituted 
by a multifaceted set of political, security, commercial and professional sensitivities sur-
rounding such bioinformation – leading to protracted data-sharing barriers and frequently 
culminating in a potentially dangerous form of global epistemic friction. Finally, this 
emergent field also comprises the novel practices and instruments (both formal and 
informal) being designed now by those stakeholders to facilitate more rapid international 
sharing of bioinformation for future global health emergencies.
Overall, the in-depth study of bioinformational diplomacy reveals how bioinforma-
tion is becoming increasingly critical to the international play of power, commerce and 
security in contemporary world politics – requiring us to broadly re-think international 
relations also as informational relations. It further reveals that beneath the purview of 
formal intergovernmental diplomacy widely studied in International Relations, there also 
lurks another thick layer of informal epistemic diplomacy routinely undertaken by scien-
tists in the course of their professional work. Scientists, too, are informal diplomatic 
actors continuously engaging in infra-diplomatic practices to globally source valuable 
knowledge resources across potentially sensitive international and geopolitical divides. 
Finally, the study of bioinformational diplomacy also fundamentally challenges the 
notion that international relations and the life sciences can be thought of as largely dis-
tinct fields. It reveals, rather, how the laboratory practices of sequencing life at tiny 
molecular scale also cascade upwards into the macro-play of sovereignty, power and 
security in international relations. The relationship between the life sciences and interna-
tional relations must, therefore, be considered one of deep constitutive entanglement.
Bioinformational diplomacy: the new management of global health 
emergencies
The management of global health emergencies is changing in the 21st century (WHO, 
2021: 2). Whereas historically scientists investigating any new outbreak needed 
4 European Journal of International Relations 00(0)
to examine biological samples of a new pathogen, such scientific investigation can 
increasingly be performed computationally just by analysing a pathogen’s genetic 
sequence data. As Bronwyn Parry argues more generally, ‘the molecularisation of bio-
logical research has transformed approaches to the study of diseases and pharmaceutical 
development. While researchers are still interested in examining specimens morphologi-
cally, these examinations are now, almost without exception, undertaken in concert with 
analyses of the genetic or biochemical composition’ (Parry, 2004: 5). Since that observa-
tion was penned, technological advances have continued apace, meaning that in some 
cases genetic sequence data is already interchangeable with physical specimens. The 
genetic sequence data of lethal pathogens are therefore also becoming far more central to 
the international management of new outbreaks.
Already scientific analysis of such sequence data can improve the international 
response to global health emergencies in three key ways. First, sequence data can accel-
erate the completion of risk assessments by helping scientists to quickly characterise a 
new pathogen, understand its virulence, identify its likely natural reservoir, and evaluate 
the overall threat it poses (Wellcome Trust, 2017: 4; WHO, 2018). During the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, for example, pathogen sequence data ‘revealed critical insights 
into the origins of infection and the evolution and transmission of the disease’ (Wellcome 
Trust, 2017: 4). During the COVID-19 outbreak, moreover, genetic sequencing practices 
quickly allowed Chinese scientists to determine that the outbreak was caused by a new 
coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), and to map the complete genetic sequence of this new virus 
in a matter of just days.
Second, sequence data enables scientists to virtually perform molecular epidemiology 
by comparing the detailed sequences of many different viruses, thereby tracing where, 
how and how quickly a new virus is spreading geographically. During the recent out-
breaks of Ebola and SARS-CoV-2, for instance, analysis of sequence data allowed track-
ing of their spatio-temporal spread and it showed ‘how different strains crossed borders 
and spread within countries’, allowing for evidence-based ‘border closures to limit its 
spread (Gardy et al., 2015; Marston et al., 2017; Wellcome Trust, 2017: 4; WHO, 2017: 
2). Increasingly, analysis of such sequence data can also assist with inferring a patho-
gen’s basic reproductive number, as well as identifying more dangerous new strains that 
emerge over the course of a pandemic (WHO, 2021: 3). This aids governments in better 
calibrating their responses, and in formulating evidence-based decisions about how to 
allocate limited public health resources.
Finally, sequence data can be harnessed for the development of new medicines, vac-
cines, and diagnostics (Yozwiak et al., 2015). During a 2013 outbreak of deadly human 
infections with H7N9 influenza in China, for example, scientists in the United States 
used genetic sequence data to artificially synthesise new virus genes in a matter of days, 
and then worked with vaccine manufacturers to rapidly develop a new H7N9 vaccine 
without needing recourse to a biological sample (Dormitzer et al., 2013; Shu and 
McCauley, 2017). This dynamic has continued apace through to COVID-19, where the 
use of sequence data is now leading to the rapid development of new genetic diagnostics 
as well as the identification of molecular targets for new vaccines and antiviral medica-
tions (WHO, 2021: x.). Already the scientific analysis of pathogen genetic sequence data 
therefore harbours immense potential for better protecting populations against the harm-
ful effects of global health emergencies.
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Yet all those attempts to harness the nascent scientific power of pathogen sequence 
data also confront one major obstacle. These vital benefits can only accrue if key stake-
holders located around the world – especially scientists, governments and the pharma-
ceutical industry – readily exchange all of this pathogen sequence data as it becomes 
newly generated in many different countries. The scientific value of pathogen sequence 
data is mostly realised at the point that those data are collectively pooled and compared 
in a large bioinformational database, making the widespread international sharing of 
such data critical (Gardy et al., 2015; Johnson and Parker, 2019). It is imperative, moreo-
ver, that stakeholders also share these data very rapidly because ‘[s]peed is everything’ 
during an outbreak (Schatz and Phillippy, 2012; Yozwiak et al., 2015).
Yet this powerful global health rationale notwithstanding, recent outbreaks have 
repeatedly struggled to achieve such rapid international sharing of pathogen sequence 
data (WHO, 2016a). During the first SARS outbreak in 2002–3, for example, only three 
virus genomes were publicly shared in the first month following identification of the 
causative agent, and only 31 had become available within the first three months (WHO, 
2021: 2). A decade later, during the 2012 outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome 
(MERS), efforts to understand its origins and source were still hampered for several 
years because of inadequate data sharing (McNabb et al., 2014). The Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa (2013–16) again highlighted ‘the deficiencies with existing data-sharing 
mechanisms’ (Dye et al., 2016); and there even ‘was three months of stasis, during which 
no new virus sequence information was made public’ (Yozwiak et al., 2015). This situa-
tion had not improved much by the time of the Zika outbreak of 2015, during which 
data-sharing issues again ‘highlighted major deficiencies in knowledge of the virus and 
disease’ (Chretien et al., 2016; Saez, 2016). Despite some notable successes, these out-
breaks have all been marked by significant withholding of data. That has ‘been bad for 
science and almost certainly bad for health’ (Pisani et al., 2016) – with potentially ‘dis-
astrous public health consequences, leading to unnecessary suffering and death’ 
(Modjarrad et al., 2016). There is thus an urgent need to better understand the tensions 
and practices surrounding the global exchange of this vital epistemic resource.
The analytical framework of bioinformational diplomacy developed here can help to 
initiate the social scientific exploration of that crucial field of practice. This approach 
differs from discussions about data-sharing taking place in the fields of the life sciences 
and global health, where data-sharing tends to be construed largely as a technical and/or 
functional challenge. The novel framework of bioinformational diplomacy proposed 
here, by contrast, seeks to understand the global sharing of pathogen sequence data as an 
international political challenge, and even as an inherently diplomatic one. At least three 
aspects endow this burgeoning field with such a decidedly diplomatic inflection. First, 
the field involves the urgent, international and cross-border exchange of information 
between actors who are geographically located in different states, thus cutting across 
multiple sovereign jurisdictions. Second, and as we will see in more detail below, those 
sequence data also become politically and commercially very sensitive amidst all the 
heightened international political pressures of an acute outbreak – precisely because of 
the critical role they now play in risk assessment, outbreak response and the development 
of life-saving medical interventions. Third, effecting the timely international exchange 
of bioinformation amidst all those acute international political pressures of an unfolding 
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global health emergency therefore requires quite careful and tactful negotiation between 
powerful stakeholders. This trilogy – of international movement, highly sensitive infor-
mation and skilful negotiation – ultimately render the international sharing of pathogen 
sequence data about global health emergencies more than just a technical, or even a 
political, challenge; it also becomes a fundamentally diplomatic one. Overall, this novel 
approach thus aims to bring deeper social scientific inflection to the analysis of data-
sharing by explicitly teasing out some of the subtler political, economic and security 
dynamics involved in passaging digital sequence data across diverse sovereign, geopo-
litical and North–South divides.
Conceptually, this new framework of bioinformational diplomacy builds upon two 
concurrent fields of study. On the one hand, the notion is informed by recent scholarship 
on diplomacy. Much of this diplomacy scholarship already goes well beyond the tradi-
tional imaginaries of high-level intergovernmental negotiations and grand diplomatic 
dramas of war and peace that long defined the field (Constantinou and Derian, 2010; 
Sending et al., 2011). Multiple studies now point to the growing diplomatic significance 
of non-state actors, as well as their informal diplomatic practices that increasingly char-
acterise the more open, networked and less state-centric multilateralism of the 21st cen-
tury (Heine, 2008; Langenhove, 2016a; Slaughter, 2019). These include studies of 
para-diplomacy (Aldecoa and Keating, 2013; Kuznetsov, 2015), transprofessional diplo-
macy (Constantinou et al., 2016), everyday diplomacy (Dittmer, 2015; Marsden et al., 
2016), science diplomacy (Kaltofen and Acuto, 2018; Langenhove, 2016b), global health 
diplomacy (Davies et al., 2015; Katz, 2009), private diplomacy (Scott-Smith, 2014), 
grassroots diplomacy (Hinton et al., 2014; Payne, 2009) and data diplomacy (Jacobson 
et al., 2018). Building upon this body of scholarship, the notion of bioinformational 
diplomacy similarly operates with such a broader understanding of diplomacy that 
encompasses both formal inter-governmental negotiations occurring in diplomatic fora 
(such as the World Health Organization or the Convention on Biodiversity), as well as 
many informal practices also widely utilised by non-state actors (like scientists and 
industry) to internationally exchange such data.
At the same time, this framework of bioinformational diplomacy builds upon recent 
social studies of science and technology, especially the rise of molecular biology as a 
powerful force within society, global health and international relations (Cooper, 2008; 
Dillon, 2015; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Elbe, 2014; Howell, 2014; Long, 2019). 
Particularly salient here is the concept of bioinformation recently defined by Bronwyn 
Parry and Beth Greenhough as ‘all information, no matter how constituted, arising 
from analyses of biological organisms and their behaviour, that can be used to eluci-
date their structure or function, identify individuals, or differentiate them from each 
other’ (Parry and Greenhough, 2017: 8). Bringing together the broadening study of 
diplomacy and the social scientific study of molecular biology, the framework of bio-
informational diplomacy proposed here thus begins to analytically capture how the 
international passaging of bioinformation about global health emergencies is rapidly 
emerging as a distinct field of formal and informal diplomatic practice in the interna-
tional system. This nascent domain of bioinformational diplomacy can be summarily 
defined as the emerging field of tensions, sensitivities, practices and enabling instru-
ments surrounding the timely international exchange of bioinformation about global 
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health emergencies. It conceptually delineates that crucial space in contemporary 
world politics where the molecular biopolitics of genetic sequencing begin to directly 
intersect with the geopolitical dynamics of sovereignty, power and security.
Making the cut molecularly: the onto-epistemology of sequential life
The international rise of bioinformational diplomacy is part of a broader biopolitical 
reconfiguration – one in which ‘life’ itself is coming to be understood more sequentially 
in the 21st century. Three intersecting developments drive the genealogical emergence 
of this field: the molecularisation of life, the informationalisation of biology, and the 
securitisation of health. First and foremost, bioinformation (like genetic sequence data) 
is premised upon the idea that life is fundamentally driven by biochemical processes 
unfolding at molecular scale. The granularity at which we can understand and imagine 
biological life has shrunk considerably over the course of the 20th century – moving 
first from the corporal body to the inner workings of the cell, and eventually advancing 
all the way to the scale of individual atoms embedded in their respective molecular 
groupings. Scientific techniques like x-ray crystallography have since allowed the pre-
cise molecular structure of DNA to be revealed. As double Nobel Prize winner Frederick 
Sanger once put it, DNA ‘contains the whole information for the development of an 
organism, coded in the form of sequences of the four nucleotide residues’ (cited in 
García-Sancho, 2012: 60). The French biochemist and Nobel prize winner Jacques 
Monod expressed this biochemical understanding of life particularly succinctly when 
he later proclaimed that all ‘living beings are chemical machines’ (Monod, 1997: 51). 
That moves biopolitics considerably beyond Foucault’s original conception of bio-
power operating at the level of the body and the population, and pushes the management 
of ‘life’ towards a deeper form of molecular biopower (Elbe, 2014, 2018; Long, 2019).
Yet this molecular vision of life is merely a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition 
for the rise of bioinformational diplomacy. Equally critical is a second process through 
which these chemical building blocks then also come to be seen as forming a complex 
system of information – a kind of metaphorical code. DNA could thus be rendered into a 
fairly simple, if also very long, text made up of only four characters (Gs, Cs, As, and Ts), 
with the resulting string of letters appearing ‘as a kind of language or expressed informa-
tion’ (Parry and Greenhough, 2017: 3–4). This ‘informationalisation’ of molecular biol-
ogy also entails a crucial process of de-corporalisation in which information effectively 
‘loses its body’ (Hayles, 1999). Once generated, genetic sequence data retain virtually no 
degree of corporality at all: ‘all the body of the thing has been divested in the interest of 
rendering it in a more purely informational form – as data or image’ (Parry, 2004: 65). 
That also makes DNA sequences much more ‘lightweight and transmissible’, as well as 
‘easier to convey from one location to another’ (Parry, 2004: 60). With the aid of comput-
ers and related information technologies (see García-Sancho, 2012; Stevens, 2011, 
2013), this informational turn in biology enables scientists to study new pathogens virtu-
ally now, without having to first wait for tedious and bureaucratic shipments of biologi-
cal materials. The informationalisation of biology is therefore a second key development 
driving the genealogical rise of bioinformational diplomacy.
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This confluence of the ‘molecular’ and the ‘informational’ has been sufficiently pow-
erful to trigger a wider biopolitical reconfiguration – effectively engendering a new 
understanding of life as an elaborate biochemical information system (Kay, 2000: 1). 
‘Life’ itself is becoming increasingly understood as a complex flow of molecular infor-
mation (see also Braun, 2007; Galloway and Thacker, 2007; Hester, 2016; Rose, 2006). 
The feminist philosopher of science Karen Barad advances the notion of an onto-episte-
mology to signal the inherent inseparability of ontology and epistemology when it comes 
to knowing and understanding the world (Barad, 2007: 409). Such a novel onto-episte-
mological entanglement is arguably also at play in the rise of genetic sequence data. 
Understanding life as sequence entails profound ontological commitments – viewing life 
as being fundamentally bio-chemical in nature. Yet it is simultaneously an epistemology, 
because it further asserts that life can now be ‘read’ and ‘known’ through detailed analy-
sis of genetic sequences. Ultimately, the rise of genetic sequence data is thus part of a 
whole new way of understanding and knowing – or ‘cutting’ into – life sequentially: 
sequential life.
Yet there is also a third dynamic critical for understanding the rise of bioinformational 
diplomacy. In the absence of an acute sense of danger, urgency and existential threat, it 
would not be such a pressing matter whether all this new bioinformation is exchanged 
globally, how widely it circulates or indeed how quickly it is exchanged. During normal 
times, those questions could largely remain a more routine matter of technical or func-
tional cooperation between stakeholders. All of this changes very quickly, however, 
amidst the securitised political context of a new lethal outbreak. During those excep-
tional periods, it does suddenly become a potential matter of life and death whether this 
data flow widely and rapidly – especially now that a number of vaccine manufacturers 
are already using genetic sequence data as an alternative way to develop new medical 
interventions (Roemer-Mahler and Elbe, 2016; WHO, 2014: 4; Yozwiak et al., 2015). 
Global health emergencies thus generate particularly intense stressors around the inter-
national circulation of bioinformation – elevating the question of its global exchange 
beyond the technical or even political spheres and transforming it into an inherently 
diplomatic issue as well. Ultimately, then, the nascent field of bioinformational diplo-
macy is forming at the genealogical conjuncture of three distinct developments – molec-
ularised life, informationalised biology and securitised health. To study such 
bioinformational diplomacy, moreover, is to essentially investigate the emergent global 
politics of sequential life – that is, to trace how the molecular biopolitics of sequential life 
are beginning to rub up against the geo-political dynamics of sovereignty, power and 
security in international relations (see also Constantinou and Opondo, 2019).
Epistemic friction: Barriers to data sharing during global health 
emergencies
What wider sensitivities traverse the emergent field of bioinformational diplomacy? 
Many leading scientists involved in early sequencing efforts hoped that all such newly-
generated data would be made freely, publicly and quickly available to everyone 
around the world. A new repository to openly share such new genetic sequence data – 
called GenBank – was even established for this very purpose as early as 1982 
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(Choudhuri, 2014: 80). Historically, GenBank is therefore closely associated with the 
open science movement and the ‘Bermuda Principles’. The latter were proposed by the 
scientist John Sulston during the Human Genome Project (HGP), which culminated in 
the first successful sequencing of the entire human genome (Hilgartner, 2017; Stevens, 
2015). Under those Bermuda Principles the leading genome-sequencing centres involved 
in the international effort committed themselves to depositing gene sequences – every 
1,000 base pairs – into GenBank within 24 hours of completing their work (So, 2012). 
Doing so would allow rapid and open international access to the data; but it would 
equally ensure that such sequence data remained a public good by preventing others from 
trying to exert intellectual property rights over such data. ‘The best way to prevent the 
sequence being carved up by private interests’, Sulston argued, ‘was to put it into the 
public domain so that, in patent office jargon, as much as possible became “prior art” and 
therefore unpatentable by others’ (Ferry and Sulston, 2002: 300). That is also why 
GenBank does not place any further restrictions upon the use of the genetic sequence 
data deposited in its database and anyone with access to the internet can freely and anon-
ymously download the sequence data contained within it (GenBank, 2019).
Those initial scientific aspirations for timely, open and unrestricted sharing of genetic 
sequence data soon came under considerable international political pressure however, 
especially amidst new infectious disease outbreaks. In 2003, for example, models of 
open data sharing quickly ran into difficulties when new human infections with a lethal 
H5N1 (‘bird’ flu) virus were detected in Asia, triggering international concern that the 
world was on the cusp of a devastating new ‘bird’ flu pandemic. The rapid transition 
towards this more securitised international political context intensified numerous under-
lying tensions surrounding pathogen sequence data and impeded much of its open shar-
ing. It quickly became apparent that some governments experiencing H5N1 outbreaks 
were unwilling for this sensitive sequence data to be made publicly available; and they 
also voiced concerns about losing intellectual property potentially attached to such 
sequences. WHO engaged in diplomatic efforts to address those concerns by creating a 
separate password-protected database at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 
United States, which could only be accessed by a select number of scientists from 
approximately fifteen of the world’s leading laboratories. This move was quickly met 
with resistance from other scientists, however, who argued that without access to those 
data they could no longer carry out their work properly and contribute to pandemic pre-
paredness efforts. Thus, the imminent threat of an H5N1 pandemic threat quickly put 
immense strain upon the whole system of open sequence data sharing and it revealed that 
during such outbreaks all three of the key stakeholders – scientists, government and 
industry – also harbour deeper sensitivities about the international sharing of such patho-
gen sequence data.
Pathogen sequence data are sensitive because they sit at the heart of multiple global 
chains of value production. Scientists generating new pathogen sequence data during a 
major international outbreak, for example, may not wish to share them rapidly because 
their career standing and progression have long been measured by publications and cita-
tions. Scientists working on a new pathogen can thus become concerned that rapidly 
sharing their data would allow a competing scientist to easily ‘scoop’ them by using that 
same data to publish more quickly (Chretien et al., 2016; Pearson, 2003). Scientists at the 
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forefront of new outbreaks suddenly also become extremely busy, as their laboratories go 
into overdrive and they often do not have enough resources to meet this surge in demand. 
Historically, some scientists have therefore decided to share virus sequence information 
in public databases only after their scientific articles had been accepted for publication 
– leading to delays of several months to the potential detriment of global health (Edelstein, 
2015: 12; Noor et al., 2006). There is also a critical North–South dimension involved 
here. Scientists from low- and middle-income countries, where many outbreaks have 
historically occurred, frequently lament that analyses from samples they shared in the 
past have subsequently been presented at international meetings and scientific confer-
ences without proper advance notification, or without including those who had shared 
the samples in the authorship arrangements (Bockarie, 2019; Sedyaningsih et al., 2008). 
One set of tensions surrounding pathogen sequence data thus pertain to how, and how 
equitably, the career/research benefits generated from those data are subsequently dis-
tributed among different scientists.
During acute international outbreaks, these longstanding problem of global scientific 
rivalry and disparity also begin to intersect with wider international political and eco-
nomic sensitivities. Governments too may have reasons for restricting the international 
sharing of sequence data, even when scientists would otherwise be prepared to share it. 
The wider circulation of the data could have negative economic ramifications that gov-
ernments are sensitive about – especially if travel to such countries is curtailed and trade 
is interrupted as a result (Aarestrup and Koopmans, 2016: 243; Centre for Evidence 
Based Medicine, 2015). Conversely, such sequence data could also lead to the develop-
ment of life-saving (and commercially highly lucrative) new medical countermeasures 
– like diagnostics, vaccines or antiviral medications (Hester and Williams, 2020). 
Intellectual property can thus become another significant barrier here, as governments 
may feel that by sharing such data they are placing something with potentially consider-
able commercial value into the public domain (Hilberg, 2015; Pottage, 2006: 150). 
Governments must, furthermore, consider the national security implications of handling 
such dangerous sequences, especially in light of their potential role in the development 
of novel bioweapons (Gostin et al., 2014). Because of those heightened political sensi-
tivities around the commercial and security ramifications of pathogen sequence data, 
some governments now require their scientists to first seek formal permission before 
sharing such data on viruses with pandemic potential, creating another potential barrier 
(WHO, 2016b: 16).
This entire field of pathogen sequence data sharing is, moreover, interspersed with 
longer standing tensions caused by the stark global health inequalities between high- and 
low-income countries (Robinson et al., 2013). Governments from low- and middle-
income countries will be concerned to ensure that their populations too can secure access 
to any new medicines and vaccines produced with the help of such sequence data – as 
newly developed medical countermeasures may later turn out to be very costly, or only 
available in insufficient quantities (Centre for Evidence Based Medicine, 2015; Pearson, 
2003), and also because of their formative historical experiences of extractive ‘biopiracy’ 
(Quaglia, 2016). This can lead to charges of ‘biocolonialism’ whereby ‘valuable samples 
and data were expropriated to the metropolitan centres of the West for use in pharmaceu-
tical development without any reciprocal benefits being returned to the source 
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communities . . ..’ (Parry and Greenhough, 2017: 22), and some data-sharing practices 
can also be seen as extending historical practices of extraction into the present (see also 
Tilley, 2017). These longer-standing concerns about global equity and justice provoke 
further political tensions still around the international exchange of pathogen sequence 
data, ultimately generating a multifaceted vortex of professional, economic, security and 
equity sensitivities surrounding that data.
All of these diverse sensitivities help to explain why, a strong global health rationale 
notwithstanding, most major outbreaks over the past two decades have encountered 
entrenched barriers to the rapid international sharing of pathogen genetic sequence data. 
Scholars of ‘big data’ invoke the notion of ‘data friction’ to capture the wide array of 
socio-material factors that can restrict the movement of data including ‘the relative 
power and influence of different actors who desire to shape the movement of data’ (Bates 
et al., 2016: 8–9). The notion of data ‘friction’ thus acknowledges how, contrary to wide-
spread perception, information does not always flow easily or naturally. Often a multi-
plicity of practical and political tensions have to first be overcome via concerted efforts 
(see also Jacobson et al., 2018); and data have to actively be made to move through a 
delicate patchwork of mechanisms, processes, incentives and infrastructures. Considering 
the experience with recent outbreaks, it is becoming evident that there are many such 
barriers also operating at international level, producing global epistemic friction that can 
hamstring the international response.
Data passporting: the Global Initiative for Sharing All Influenza Data 
(GISAID)
What new instruments are being designed to improve the international sharing of patho-
gen sequence data for future global health emergencies? Over the past decade, several 
key stakeholders in the influenza field have begun experimenting with an alternative 
model of bioinformational diplomacy. Officially launched at the World Health Assembly 
(WHA) in 2008, the Global Initiative for Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) utilises a 
different model of data licensing to address the deeper sensitivities surrounding pathogen 
sequence data and as a way of providing data contributors with greater levels of protec-
tion about how others subsequently use that data.
This licensing model means that, in contrast to GenBank, users accessing pathogen 
sequence data through GISAID must first consent to a unique database access agreement 
(DAA) governing the data contained in its EpiFlu database. This unique data access 
agreement contains multiple binding stipulations, including that users will share their 
data with others in the GISAID network, but will not distribute such data to other non-
GISAID users. Users must further agree to credit the use of others’ data in their publica-
tions, to make best efforts to collaborate with the scientific laboratory from which the 
sequence data originated, and to involve them in research using the data. The agreement 
also commits users to maintain common access to any technology subsequently derived 
from such sequence data, so that it can be used for research and the development of diag-
nostics, medicines and vaccines. This last stipulation is aimed at preventing intellectual 
property assertions by industry (or others) that might subsequently make it more difficult 
for low-income countries to access new medical interventions (GISAID, 2011).
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Use of this data access agreement does not mean that GISAID is abandoning the prin-
ciple of a publicly accessible sequence database, because any person can still obtain 
credentials for accessing data through GISAID. It does mean, however, that GISAID 
prohibits anonymous access to the data in the way that GenBank does. GISAID instead 
requires all new users to initially undertake a one-time process of positive identification 
(GISAID, 2011). This identification mechanism makes it easier for scientists to discover, 
and properly acknowledge, those who originally contributed the data – improving 
‘sequence etiquette’ and building greater trust in data sharing (Fearnley, 2020). That 
process of positively identifying the contributors and users of data also gives GISAID 
the basis to enforce the rules set forth in the database access agreement. In extreme cases, 
GISAID can even bar a user’s access to the database, if they are seen to violate the terms 
of the database access agreement. Crucially, this licensing mechanism means that data 
deposited through GISAID also does not fall under the legal definition of ‘public 
domain’. GISAID does not remove or waive any potential pre-existing ‘rights’ that might 
apply to such data; any ownership rights potentially surrounding the sequence data are 
therefore unaffected by virtue of being submitted to GISAID. Overall, GISAID’s use of 
this alternative data licensing mechanism, in conjunction with its process of positive 
identification, thus provides an additional level of assurance to governments concerned 
about intellectual property, as well as to scientists worried about being ‘scooped’.
In recent years, GISAID’s alternative sequence data sharing model has become widely 
embraced by the global influenza research community. That includes the Global Influenza 
Surveillance and Response Systems (GISRS), which spans more than one hundred coun-
tries, monitors the global spread of influenza, and makes recommendations for the com-
position of the annual flu vaccines. GISAID has thus managed to attract a large volume 
of genetic sequence data on influenza viruses over the past decade, and now reportedly 
contains the most comprehensive collection of such high-quality influenza data in the 
world (Saez, 2016). Beyond seasonal influenza, moreover, GISAID has also begun to 
develop a track record in facilitating the sharing of sequence data about influenza viruses 
with human pandemic potential such as H5N1, H1N1 and H7N9 (ECDC, 2014; WHO, 
2009). In the influenza field GISAID has therefore rapidly established itself as an alter-
native mechanism of bioinformational diplomacy and as a new international information 
infrastructure for (influenza) sequence data (see Bowker et al., 2019).
GISAID’s ability to facilitate such increased international sharing of influenza genetic 
sequence data is largely due to how its licensing model places additional conditions and 
obligations around the handling of such data – a practice that might be called ‘data pass-
porting’. Data passporting can be understood here as the international counterpart to the 
notion of data structuring developed recently by scholars in the field of big data. Data 
structuring captures the ‘configurations of digital traces that are organised and ordered in 
ways that allow for analysis, value extraction and connection to different forms of social 
activity such as commercial production or political advocacy’ (Flyverbom and Murray, 
2018: 2). The concept of data structures was thus developed to ‘highlight how design 
choices, ways of sorting data and other dimensions of digital spaces create novel condi-
tions for knowledge production and communication in general’ (Flyverbom and Murray, 
2018: 10). This notion of data structuring is particularly useful for capturing the signifi-
cance of the internal conditioning of data within different information systems.
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The comparative success of GISAID in the influenza field suggests, however, that the 
external conditioning of data can be just as significant, especially when it comes to 
facilitating its rapid international transmission. Much like passports have historically set 
out the conditions/obligations under which people can/cannot move across different 
countries and sovereign jurisdictions (see Salter, 2003), so too the key to GISAID’s suc-
cess in encouraging the greater international sharing of sequence data is closely tied to 
the wider envelope of legal and ethical obligations placed upon users in terms of how 
they access and subsequently use the data. The notion of data passporting proposed here 
captures this key difference between the internal and external configuration of data and 
it further highlights the growing significance becoming attached now to the external 
conditions placed upon bioinformation in order to facilitate its greater international dis-
semination and rapid cross-border passaging, particularly during acute outbreaks.
Yet this significant headway made by GISAID in the influenza field notwithstanding, 
many questions about international pathogen sequence data sharing still remain unre-
solved (Reardon et al., 2016). Although it is impossible to know for certain, it seems 
likely that even today a considerable amount of newly generated sequence data is still not 
being shared; and some countries also continue to share much more data than others. 
There is, moreover, a major gap that remains because many outbreaks – like MERS, Zika 
and Ebola – are not caused by influenza viruses. Here the outbreak of COVID-19 marked 
another critical test for the rapidly evolving field of bioinformational diplomacy. Chinese 
scientists were able to sequence the new virus within 72 hours, and notified WHO of a 
new outbreak on the last day of December 2019 (Xiaoyu, 2020). In early January, 
Chinese scientists then shared the first complete sequence of the new coronavirus on a 
new open access website called virological.org. They also deposited sequence data in 
GenBank and approached GISAID to see whether the platform would be willing to host 
sequence data about new coronavirus (Pandey, 2020). At that point GISAID decided, for 
the first time, to open up its sharing platform beyond influenza data and to include genetic 
sequence data about SARS-CoV-2 as well. This enabled scientists in other countries to 
quickly use such shared sequence data to begin the process of developing new diagnos-
tics and vaccines for the virus (Fearnley, 2020). Following that decision, moreover, there 
has been a steady and significant increase in the sharing of such SARS-CoV-2 pathogen 
sequence data through GISAID. By September 2020 that number had surpassed more 
than 115,000 sequences from more than one hundred nations around the world, and at the 
time of writing that had further increased to more than 740,000 (GISAID, 2021), mean-
ing that genomic sequences for SARS-CoV-2 are now being shared through GISAID at 
a historically unprecedented rate (WHO, 2021: 1). Although a significant proportion of 
this data comes from a comparatively small number of countries that engage extensively 
in virus sequencing, the overall volume and geographic spread of the data is sufficiently 
large to suggest that the GISAID model of bioinformational diplomacy pioneered in the 
influenza field might also become more widely applicable during other future global 
health emergencies.
Overall, however, it remains impossible to predict at the time of writing how this 
emerging field of bioinformational diplomacy will unfold in future. It is still too early in 
the course of the COVID-19 pandemic to properly evaluate how effective the GISAID 
data-sharing mechanism will ultimately prove in managing all of the multifaceted 
14 European Journal of International Relations 00(0)
sensitivities and potentially conflicting interests between the various stakeholders 
involved (WHO, 2021: 58). Even the SARS-CoV-2 data being shared through GISAID 
now, moreover, is likely to represents only a proportion of all the pathogen genetic 
sequence data being generated around the world and many such data are today also pro-
duced in commercial (rather than public) laboratories, which often consider such data to 
be commercially proprietary. Others, in turn, continue to prefer older public domain 
models like GenBank that do not place any additional restrictions on the data, or to sub-
mit to multiple platforms simultaneously (Wadman, 2021). Considerable variations also 
remain in the speed with which data is shared (Cohen, 2021) and some scientists are still 
waiting to share until at least a pre-print publication has been prepared (WHO, 2021: 58). 
All the while new models of bioinformational diplomacy continue to emerge due to the 
magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic such as the COVID-19 Data Portal recently 
launched by the European Bioinformatics Institute, the US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention’s (CDC) new SARS-CoV-2 Sequencing for Public Health Emergency 
Response, Epidemiology and Surveillance (SPHERES) consortium and the COVID-19 
Genomics UK Consortium. Overall, the field of bioinformational diplomacy is thus far 
from settled, and it very much remains an evolving field of practice characterised by 
many unresolved questions, heterogeneous practices and a fragmented patchwork of 
competing models.
The global politics of sequential life
Beyond those uncertainties, all this ongoing contestation, negotiation and experimenta-
tion is evidence of how the rise of genetic sequence data is already beginning to recon-
tour the play of security, power and sovereignty in contemporary world politics. The 
promissory quality of pathogen genetic sequence data is engendering new socio-techni-
cal imaginaries in the security domain (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015). The most striking of 
these is the ambition to seamlessly combine molecular biology and bioinformatics into a 
new real-time global ‘digital immune system’. This would consist of all the amalgamated 
pathogen sequence data being generated around the world today, in order to improve 
outbreak surveillance and speed up future outbreak detection (Schatz and Phillippy, 
2012). The rise of pathogen sequence data is also introducing new stratifications into the 
field of international security: there are countries in the world capable now of using 
sequence data to better secure their populations against health-based threats, while many 
other countries occupy a much more subaltern position of mostly being asked to freely 
share their sequence data with the rest of the world (Go, 2016; see Harding, 2011; Helmy 
et al., 2016; Reardon, 2017). More broadly, all these emergent molecular practices 
around sequential life are also buttressing the wider field of global health security 
(Kamradt-Scott, 2015; Rushton, 2019; Rushton and Youde, 2014; Samimian-Darash 
et al., 2016) by raising awareness about the continual presence of biological danger, and 
by facilitating enhanced molecular strategies for developing new medical countermeas-
ures. The pathogen genetic sequence data being generated inside of scientific laborato-
ries are thus becoming deeply entangled with the wider field of (bio)security (see Hoijtink 
and Leese, 2019; Vogel et al., 2017).
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Furthermore, the rise of this valuable new informational resource is also playing into 
the international distribution of power. When scientists still needed access to physical 
specimens of new pathogens, this presented low- and middle-income countries (e.g. 
Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines) with opportunities to develop new 
political strategies for resisting their perceived exploitation. Countries like Indonesia, for 
example, began vociferously asserting their ‘viral sovereignty’ and started leveraging 
access to biological samples sourced from inside their territories in return for improved 
access to accruing benefits like new medical interventions (Sedyaningsih et al., 2008; 
Servick, 2016). Over the past decade, this strategy has triggered the need for formal dip-
lomatic activity, including lengthy and high-level intergovernmental negotiations lead-
ing to new multilateral agreements governing the equitable international sharing of 
resulting benefits. Those include the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing and 
the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (Rourke, 2019; Sedyaningsih 
et al., 2008; Servick, 2016). The PIP Framework, for example, requires that commercial 
industries benefiting from access to influenza virus samples now make significant finan-
cial contributions (through the PIP Secretariat) to this framework. These additional funds 
can then be used to facilitate technology transfer and capacity building in LMICs. The 
PIP framework also entails further provisions to ensure that during any future flu pan-
demic a proportion of – usually quite scarce – pandemic vaccines will be explicitly 
reserved for affected countries (rather than allowing these to flow almost exclusively to 
high-income countries).
Pathogen genetic sequence data, however, is widely regarded as falling outside the 
scope of those existing multilateral agreements. The hard-fought diplomatic frameworks 
governing the international sharing of benefits derived from genetic resources were 
mostly negotiated on the basis of still having to exchange biological materials, that is, 
physical samples of viruses and other microbes (Halabi, 2019; Hinterberger and Porter, 
2015). As sequence data become an increasingly powerful informational resource, it 
remains unclear what options will remain for LMICs to secure more equitable access to 
the benefits accruing from ‘their’ genetic resources in future (Fearnley, 2020). There is 
growing uncertainty as to whether they will be able to develop other diplomatic strate-
gies moving forward, or whether their negotiating positions will ultimately become 
eroded due to the emergence of pathogen sequence data. Here, then, the rise of genetic 
sequence data is also already beginning to have significant power effects in the interna-
tional system that are associated with shifting from the exchange of biological specimens 
to increasingly informational exchanges in the sequential management of outbreaks, par-
ticularly how the rise of sequence data is re-contouring (often already asymmetric) power 
relations between high- and low-income countries.
Ultimately, these wider international political impacts of pathogen genetic sequence 
data are even bleeding into the domain of sovereignty by raising deeper questions about 
whether governments can retain sovereign control over genetic resources located within 
their borders (Hinterberger and Porter, 2015). Only recently, for example, a US company 
managed to patent a new Ebola medicine developed solely on the basis of digital sequence 
data deposited in the public database GenBank, thus bypassing any international benefit-
sharing obligations that would have likely accrued if using material samples sourced 
from a foreign country (Hammond, 2019). The prospect that the rise of sequence data 
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could eventually lead many LMIC governments to lose effective control over ‘their’ 
genetic resources has triggered the diplomatic need for additional intergovernmental 
negotiations about how to also handle ownership of such sequence data (and any associ-
ated intellectual property) moving forward. These formal diplomatic negotiations have 
now commenced within the context of the PIP Framework and the Nagoya Protocol. 
Thus, the informal diplomatic practices of life scientists exchanging newly generated 
pathogen genetic sequence data across national borders have also triggered the need for 
new formal diplomatic negotiations between governments about how to handle such 
sequence data during future global health emergencies. In the end, the practices of ren-
dering life into legible molecular sequence unfolding inside of scientific laboratories also 
cascade upwards into the macro-political play of security, power and sovereignty in 
international relations: the global politics of sequential life.
Conclusion
This article investigated the growing international political significance becoming 
attached to bioinformation especially in the context of global health emergencies. While 
it has focused on just one such type of bioinformation, there are evidently also many 
other kinds of bioinformation similarly becoming more critical to the effective manage-
ment of outbreaks in the 21st century (Holzscheiter and van Panhuis, 2016). These 
include various types of epidemiological data used for tracking the geographic and 
demographic spread of a disease over time. It further includes scientific data about the 
detailed protein structures of emergent pathogens, as these data too can now be used to 
better understand their transmission and to identify new drug targets. It also includes 
clinical trial data about the safety and effectiveness of new medical interventions, which 
is becoming more significant as governments seek to develop biomedical interventions 
to protect their populations against new outbreaks. It cannot be assumed that existing 
data-sharing sensitivities will be identical across different types of data, nor that sharing 
practices effective for one kind of bioinformation will be effective for all other types as 
well. There are, moreover, additional challenges triggered by the urgent need to also bet-
ter integrate all these diverse types of bioinformation, and the concomitant ‘platformiza-
tion’ of data sharing mechanisms, that is, trying to move those systems from a position 
of hosting fairly rudimentary sequence databases, towards building much broader plat-
forms capable of interfacing many different actors using such data for further processing 
(Helmond, 2015). All the while, many of the difficulties experienced so starkly in rela-
tion to outbreaks are also beginning to spill over into more routine forms of international 
scientific research as well. Thus, there remains much about bioinformational diplomacy 
that we still do not know, and that will require further study in future.
Just from analysing pathogen genetic sequence data, however, it is apparent that state 
sovereignty is already becoming much more closely tethered to the capacity of govern-
ments to access and control such bioinformational flows (Hinterberger and Porter, 2015; 
see also Stephenson, 2011). Like other key areas of International Relations, including the 
conduct of war (see Cooper, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009), the management of global 
health emergencies is undergoing a protracted process of informationalisation. 
Bioinformation too now forms an integral part of what the information philosopher 
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Luciano Floridi calls the global ‘infosophere’, that is, the dense ‘informational environ-
ment constituted by all informational entities, their properties, interactions, processes 
and mutual relations’ within which states are now embedded (Floridi, 2014: 41). The 
emergence of such bioinformation – its process of in-form-ation – is already triggering 
new constellations, networks and hierarchies in the international system; and the power 
of states in the international order increasingly depends upon their capacity to rapidly 
generate, access and evaluate different flows of information. Here, then, the rise of bio-
informational diplomacy requires scholars to broadly re-think international relations 
also as informational relations.
The nascent field of bioinformational diplomacy additionally reveals something about 
the changing nature of 21st century diplomacy. It shows that beneath the level of formal 
intergovernmental diplomacy widely familiar to scholars of International Relations, 
there also lurks another thick layer of more informal and second-order diplomacy: the 
epistemic diplomacy routinely conducted by life scientists. In Science in Action Bruno 
Latour described the everyday material practices taking place inside of scientific labora-
tories. This eventually culminated in the development of actor-network theory (ANT), 
but also produced many insights about the intricate workings of scientific practice 
including his comparatively lesser known notion of ‘centres of calculation’. Latour had 
observed that scientists are in fact critically dependent upon the global circulatory move-
ment and international accumulation of a wide variety of knowledge resources sourced 
from all around the world such as ‘specimens, maps, diagrams, logs, questionnaires and 
article forms of all sorts’ that are then assembled and concentrated in leading laboratories 
or ‘centres of calculation’ (Latour, 1987: 232). Without access to those international 
resources, scientists would be unable carry out their work. The study of bioinformational 
diplomacy suggests that those international cycles of scientific accumulation today also 
span pathogen genetic sequence data, and that scientists must therefore continually 
develop, sustain and buttress various informal strategies to globally source this vital 
bioinformation across sensitive international and geopolitical divides.
In the second instance, the rise of bioinformational diplomacy thus intimates that 
scientists too must be considered as a particular type, or class, of informal diplomatic 
actors in the contemporary international system. Scientists do not just contribute 
their epistemic expertise to formal diplomatic processes that require specialist 
knowledge inputs; they themselves must also continually develop a plethora of more 
infra-diplomatic practices to globally access the valuable epistemic resources so 
essential for their own work. What, then, are the other informal mechanisms and 
strategies of epistemic diplomacy utilised by scientists to internationally source the 
diverse knowledge resources that they need for conducting their investigations espe-
cially across sensitive international divides? How do these informal practices seek to 
navigate and potentially circumvent burdensome bureaucratic requirements, national 
regulations and/or existing international agreements? How, moreover, can these the 
more informal practices of scientists potentially also trigger the need for significant 
adjustments to government practice, diplomatic arrangements and international law? 
These more informal and infra-diplomatic efforts routinely undertaken by scientists 
too deserve more scholarly attention.
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Finally, the emerging field of bioinformational diplomacy also challenges scholars of 
International Relations to begin thinking differently about the underlying relationship 
between international relations and the life sciences. Recent years have seen increased 
scholarly interest in the relationship between science and international politics (see 
Bosquet, 2010; Hoijtink and Leese, 2019; Vogel et al., 2017) giving rise to a new schol-
arly subfield of science diplomacy (Domingues, 2019; Flink and Rüffin, 2019; Kaltofen 
and Acuto, 2018). This scholarly field of science diplomacy is heavily influenced by the 
tri-partite conception of science diplomacy advanced in the report on New Frontiers in 
Science Diplomacy, jointly published in 2010 by the U.K. Royal Society and the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (Royal Society, 2010). The report 
outlines three major ways in which the relationship between science and diplomacy can 
be conceptualised: (1) diplomacy for science – how diplomacy can facilitate interna-
tional scientific cooperation; (2) science in diplomacy – how scientists can inform for-
eign policy through generating scientific evidence and new technologies; and (3) science 
for diplomacy – using scientific collaboration as a seemingly neutral area though which 
to improve fraught interstate relations. Throughout this influential report, science and 
diplomacy are thus considered as distinct professional fields that can be put into the 
instrumental service of one another.
The rise of bioinformational diplomacy challenges and problematises this prominent 
view. Through the in-depth study of bioinformational diplomacy it has been possible to 
carefully trace how the sequencing of life at tiny molecular scale undertaken inside of 
scientific laboratories also ends up recontouring the macro-political play of security, 
power and sovereignty in international relations. Rather than thinking about science and 
diplomacy as largely separate domains that can be put into instrumental service of one 
another, the rise of bioinformational diplomacy instead points towards a far more deeply 
entangled, and even constitutive, relationship between the life sciences and international 
relations. Moving forward, there is thus also a need to explore what other kinds of scien-
tific practice, in biology but also beyond, are similarly becoming constitutive of new 
international relations today like quantum physics, the neuro-sciences, the nano-sciences, 
and so forth. For we cannot come to know the ‘international’ properly, without also 
studying science.
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Note
1. I have benefitted from comments and discussions with participants at the inaugural Global 
Health Security Conference in Sydney, the 13th Pan-European Conference of the European 
International Studies Association, the Durham Global Security Institute, the ‘Global Health 
and Diplomacy’ workshop at the University of Vienna, the ‘Science-Diplomacy Nexus’ 
workshop at the 6th European Workshops in International Studies in Krakow, the seminar on 
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‘Health in International Relations’ at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs in Vienna, 
the ‘H-Dreams’ workshop at the Brighton and Sussex Medical School, the 2018 Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association, and the ‘Medical Dominance in Global 
Health’ workshop at the WZB Research Group on Global Humanitarian Medicine in Berlin. 
I am also grateful to William Ampofo, Anna Holzscheiter, Rebecca Katz, Christopher Long, 
Magnus Marsden, Melanie Newport, Louiza Odysseos, Alexandra Phelan, Anna Pichelstorfer, 
Clionadh Raleigh, Anne Roemer-Mahler and Rorden Wilkinson for their feedback on earlier 
versions of these ideas.
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